Abstract. Stackelberg games and their resulting nonconvex programming problems can be used to model the behavior of independent decision-makers acting within a hierarchy. This paper examines the formation of coalitions within such organizations of optimizers for a large class of hierarchical problems. The mathematical characteristics of these games and the implications of their solutions are considered.
Introduction
Conflict and cooperation among organized groups of individuals are natural outgrowths of the organizational process. An organization might consist of manufacturers competing within an economic system for the same market, or computers within a network sharing system resources. The types of communication and coordination of activities within the organizational structure can cause the system to flourish or decay. By understanding the behavior of such systems, we can improve their effectiveness and eliminate their inherent inefficiencies. Bialas and Chew [ l l , 121 presented a model of cooperation among decision-makers in a hierarchical organization. The mathematical foundations of this work were based heavily on the theory of Stackelberg games and of interest to those working on problems of optimal control (see, for example, Simaan and Cruz [45] , Basar and Olsder [6] , and Tolwinski [46] ).
A limitation of the previous work by Bialas and Chew was its restriction to linear objective functions for each of the players and a requirement that all feasible decisions had to reside within a convex polytope. This paper extends these results to a much larger class of problems. This should further strengthen the links among optimal control theory, mathematical programming and the analysis of economic decisions.
Overview
Since the advent of linear programming and game theory in the 1940's and early 1950's [23,48] a substantial effort has been directed toward analyzing the behavior of interacting decision-makers, each attempting to optimize individual objectives in view of decisions made by others. A wide spectrum of scientific disciplines have dedicated a portion of their efforts to the analysis of these problems. These fields include operations research, control theory, economics, psychology, human factors, organizational behavior, sociology and political science.
Because of the pervasive nature of this topic, it has appeared in a variety of settings and adorned in different mathematical raiments. The earliest work in game theory of von Neumann and Morgenstem [48] and their colleagues addresses important aspects of these problems. More recent results on the behavior of players in cooperative and noncooperative n-person games can be found in the work of Billera [17] , Lucas [35] , Maschler [37] , Nash [38] , Peleg [40] , Shapley [41, 421, and many others. With the development of the Dantzig-Wolfe Decomposition Principle [24] and its economic interpretation by Baumol and Fabian [7] , efforts have been directed towards using mathematical programming to describe the behavior of individuals interacting within organizations which direct the flow of resources, costs and information. Some of the research in this area can be found in the work of Anan- [36] , and Wendell [49] .
Social scientists and psychologists have also provided significant results, including experimental work, in the study of coalition formation among individual decision-makers. Included is the research of Caplow [19, 201, Gamson [27] , and Vinacke and Arkoff [47] .
These citations represent only a fraction of the vast wealth of research that has been devoted to this subject. They do, however, offer an idea of the broad interest and implications of this large body of work.
The General Problem
We will briefly reintroduce the Stackelberg model presented by Bialas and Chew [12] . That work was based, in large part, on a class of mathematical programming problems often called "multilevel programming" problems (see Bialas and Karwan [ 131) . In this model, a decision-maker at one level of the hierarchy may have his objective function and decision space determined, in part, by decisions taken at other levels. Each player's control instnments may allow him to influence the decisions at other levels, and thereby improve his own objective function. In some examples, these instruments may include the allocation and use of resources at lower levels, or, perhaps, the benefits conferred upon other levels.
These Stackelberg games have the following common characteristics:
Definition 1 Let rhe vector x E R" be partitioned as x = (xa. xb).
Let S c RN be compact, and let f : RN -+ R be continuous on S.
Then is the set of rational reactions o f f over S.
To formally define the n-player Stackelberg game, let the vector of decision variables for all players, denoted by z E RN, be partitioned among n players with
where Nk = N . We will require that the n players choose values of x E S' c RN, where S1 is compact. The shape of S'
will determine the ability of one player to affect the set of feasible choices of the other players.
Let {fl(x), f z ( x ) , . . . , fn(x)} be a set of continuous functions with
Definition 2 The set Sk represents the feasible outcomes resulting from the rational reactions of players at levels 1,2, . . . , I; -1. Hence, Sk contains all of the information necessary for player k to assess the behavior of these players.
Given the preemptive decisions (2k+1,. . . , 2") of the first n -k leading players, the optimization problem which must be solved by the player at level k is then
. .
This establishes a collection of nested mathematical programming 
An Illustration
Consider a game with three players, named 1 , 2 and 3, each of whom controls an unlimited quantity of a commodity, with a different commodity for each player. Their task is to jointly fill a container of size equal to one unit with an amount of their respective commodities, never exceeding the capacity of the container. The task will be performed in a sequential fashion, with player 3 (the player at the "top" of the hierarchy) taking his turn first. A player cannot remove a commodity placed in the container by a previous player.
At the end of the sequence, a referee pays each player one dollar (or fraction, thereof) for each unit of his respective commodity which 'Note that the leader is designated as player n, not player 1. Although not immediately intuitive, this convention results in many properties of Lk being invariant for fixed k and varying n. For example, Lz will have the mathematical properties of a two-level problem in a system with two, three or 100 levels.
has been placed in the container. It is easy to see that since player 3 has preemptive control over the container, he will fill it completely with his commodity, and collect one dollar.
Suppose, however, that the rules are changed slightly so that, in addition, player 3 could collect five dollars for each unit of player one's commodity which is placed in the container. Since player 2 does not gain such a benefit from player one's commodity, player 2 would fill the container with his own commodity on his tum, if given the opportunity. This is the rational reaction of player 2. For this reason, player 3 has no choice but to fill the container with his commodity and collect only one dollar.
Coalition Formation
Note that in the previous example there are six dollars available to the three players. Divided equally, each of the three players could improve their payoffs. However, because of the sequential and independent nature of the decisions, such a solution cannot be attained.
The solution to the above problem is, thus, not Pareto-optimal (see Chew [22] ). However, as suggested by the example, the formation of a coalition among subsets of the players could provide a means to achieve Pareto-optimality. The members of each coalition act for the benefit of the coalition as a whole. The questions immediately raised are: 0 which coalitions will tend to form, 0 are the coalitions enforceable, and 0 what will be the resulting distribution of wealth to each of the players?
The abstract game and accompanying solution concept introduced by Shenoy [43, 441 provide a framework for answering these questions in this Stackelberg setting.
Definition 3 An abstract game is a pair ( X , dam) where X is a set whose members are called outcomes and dam is a binary relation on X called domination.
Let G = { 1,2,. . . , n } denote the set of n players. Let P = { R I , R2, . . . , R M } denote a coalition structure or partition of G into nonempty coalitions where R, nRj = 0 for all i # j and nEIRi = G.
Let Po E {{ l}, {2}, . . . , {n}} denote the coalition structure where no coalitions have formed and let Pc {G} denote the grand coalition.
Consider P = { R I , Rz, . . . , R M } an arbitrary coalition structure.
Assume that utility is additive and transferable. As a result of the coalition formation, the objective function of each player in coalition Rj becomes, .&,Cz) = f i ( z ) .
:ER,
Although the sequence of the players' decisions has not changed, their objective functions have. Let R(i) denote the unique coalition Rj E P such that player i E R j . Instead of maximizing fi(x), player i will now be maximizing fh (,,(z) . Let the solution to the n-level optimization problem which results from these objective functions be denoted by f(P).
Definition 4 Suppose that SI is compact and P(P) is unique. The value of (or payoff to) coalition R j E P, denoted by v(R,, P), is given by
R j , P)
.
fi(P(P)).
t€R, Bialas and Chew [ l l ] have shown that U ( . ) need not be superadditive. Hence, one must be careful when applying some of the traditional game theory results which require superadditivity to this class of problems. 
Definition 5 A solution configuration is a pair (r,P), where

:ER
The first condition implies that each decision maker in R prefers coalition structure P, to coalition structure P,. The second condition ensures that R is a feasible coalition in PT. That is, R must not demand more for the imputation r than its value, v(R, P?).
Definition 8
The core, C, of an abstract game is the set of undominated, feasible solution configurations.
When the core is nonempty, each of its elements represents an enforceable solution configuration within the hierarchy.
Results
We have now defined a model of the formation of coalitions among players in a Stackelberg game. Perfect information is assumed among the players, and coalitions are allowed to form freely. No matter which coalitions form, the order of the players' actions remains the same. Each coalition earns the combined proceeds that each individual coalition member would have received under the original Stackelberg game. Therefore, a player's rational decision may now be altered because he is acting for the joint benefit of the members of his coalition.
Using the above model, several results can be obtained regarding the formation of coalitions among the players. First, the distribution of wealth to any feasible coalition cannot exceed the value of the grand coalition. This is provided by the following lemma:
Proof. Let P = { R I , R2,. . . , h}. Since We also know that f,(?(P)) 5 V' since ?(P) E SI and ~( P G ) E SI, and 2(Pc) is the solution to the mathematical programming problem max C:=I fi(5) st: 5 E SI.
Hence,
,=I ,=I w Theorem 1 shows that coalition structures in the core have an even stricter requirement. Specifically, if the core of the abstract game is non-empty, the total value of any imputation must equal the value of the grand coalition.
Proof. From Lemma 1 we have already proven that C:=l z; 5 V*. We niust now show that z; 2 V'. We will do this by contradiction. Suppose that (2, P) E C # @ and zi < V'. Let Note that (z', PG) E 0 and (z',Pc) dom (z,P). Hence, ( z , P ) C which is a contradiction. We are now prepared to show that if the core is nonempty, then there always exists a solution configuration involving the grand coalition among the solution configurations in the core. It is also possible to construct a sufficient condition for the core to be empty. This is provided in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3
The abstract game (0, dom) has C = 0 i f there exist coalition structures PI, "2, . . . P,,, and coalitions Rj E P, 0' = 1,. . . , m ) with Rj fl Rk = (b for all j # k such that Proof. We will show that, given Condition 2, for any solution configuration (z,Pc) E 0 we can find a solution configuration (y, P,) E 0 such that (y, P,) dam ( z , PG).
We will prove the result by contradiction. Suppose that there does not exist a solution configuration (y, P I ) E 0 for any j which dominates (z,PG). Then, far all (y,P,) E 0 0' = 1,. . . , m), we 
T
In particular, Relation 3 will be true for a solution configuration ( y , P j ) E 0 ( j = l , ..., m)with
IER,
Summing both sides of Relations 3 and 4 over j yields which is a contradiction to Condition 2.
Therefore, for any choice (~, P G ) E 0 we can find a solution configuration (y,PJ) E 0 such that CtER, y, > CtER, z, for some Rj E P3. Hence (y,P,) dom (z,Pc) .
Finally, we can show that, in any 2-person game of this type, the core is always nonempty.
Theorem 4 I f n = 2 then C #a.
Proof. There are only two possible coalition structures, namely PO = {{1},{2}} and PG = {{1,2}}. Note that ?(PO) E S' and
This can be rewritten as
(5)
We will show that if (r, 'PO) E 0 and (s, PG) E 0 then (r, 'PO) cannot dominate (s, PG) for any r when s = (SI, s2) 
We can assume, without loss of generality, 
An Example
We will expand on the illustration given in Section 4. Let cij represent the reward to player i if the commodity controlled by player j is placed in the container. Let C represent the matrix [c;j] and let z be an n-dimensional vector with zj representing the amount of commodity j placed in the container. Note that Cy=, zj 5 1 and zj 2 0 for j = 1,. . . n. For the illustration provided in Section 4, c = 0 1 0 .
Note that CzT is a vector whose components represent the earnings to each player.
For three players, the problem can be viewed as being played within the polytope shown in Figure 1 . Player 3 (at the top of the hierarchy) first selects his choice for the 2 3 coordinate of the solution vector. Then player 2 selects 12, still staying within the polytope, and finally player 1 chooses 21. Once the three components have been selected, CzT represents the payoffs to the three players. Bialas and Chew [12] provide a simple procedure to solve this game. The algorithm requires c11 > 0.
[ : : : I Figure 1 : The feasible region for the example game.
Step 0: Initialize z = 1 and j = 1. Go to Step 1.
Step 1: if z = n, stop. The solution is i, = 1 and i k = 0 for k fj.
Otherwise go to
Step 2.
Step 2: Set z = z + 1. If c,, > c,,, then set j = i. Go to Step 1.
If no ties occur in
Step 2 (i.e., c,, fc,,), then it can be shown that the above algorithm solves the problem (see Chew [221) . Consider the three player game of this form with From Theorem 3, we know that the core for this game is empty.
Conclusion
This paper has extended previous results for evaluating the effects of coalition formation to a large class of what can be called cooperative Stackelberg games. We have defined a Stackelberg game with an imbedded cooperative game which still retains the information framework of the original Stackelberg game.
